

**TOP SECRET CHES**

TCS-1882-57

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28 August 1957

GENERAL CABELL'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Gentlemen:

Our visit today is for the purpose of giving you a progress report on AQUATONE operations to date, and of discussing the problem of future AQUATONE missions. In the latter connection, I recently requested permission from the President to conduct certain missions, which would cover specific vital reconnaissance objectives bearing acutely on guided missiles, atomic energy, and the Long Range Air Force. His reply was in the negative.

I am concerned that the reason for the President's view, may stem from the fact that we have not got across to him, the real significance of the intelligence requirements that we have in mind. He just does not seem to have hoisted aboard, the ultimate purpose of these missions. Accordingly, it is my feeling, that at some future time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Director of CIA, separately or together, may have the opportunity to impress upon the President, the ominous implications of uncertainties which exist in our knowledge of what the Soviets are up to, and of the real opportunity which we have readily available to go a long way towards solving

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critical intelligence problems. Colonel Bridge of the Air Force is going to lay before you the requirements stemming from our National estimates, as they bear upon our National estimates, and what we can hope would be the outcome if coverage of specified reconnaissance objectives were permitted and accomplished.

Thereupon, Mr. Bissell, the Project Director of AQUATONE, will outline for you the current status of operations and capabilities, after which I will conclude with some brief remarks.

Colonel Bridge.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR GENERAL CABELL

You can see from the presentation of Colonel Bridge and Mr. Bissell that, whereas we are seriously lacking in vital information in order to produce sounder estimates for basic policy and budgetary decision, we are not in a position where we have to lie down and accept our plight. We have a good chance, on the basis of careful and sound intelligence planning--and within our operational capability--to obtain information which would have a major effect on our defense planning and policy decisions. Resulting alterations in our Intelligence estimates might have a direct bearing on the spending of vast sums of money.

What we are faced with now, is the task of seeking and obtaining a new increment, of limited authority, to conduct missions on specific reconnaissance objectives. That increment of authority would cover the following objectives, and no more:

Guided Missiles (1) -----

KAPUSTIN YAR



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Long Range Bomber Force (7)

SARATOV/ENGELS

UKRAINA

CHEPELEVKA

BELAYA TSEKOV

VORONEZH

KUYBYSHEV

KAZAN

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